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BOOK REVIEW
Courts of Terror. TELFORD TAYLOR. New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
Inc., 1976. Pp. xi, 184. $6.95. New York: Vintage Books (Random
House), 1976. Pp. xi, 184. $1.65 (pap.).
Reviewed by Paul Sherman*
In Courts of Terror, Professor Telford Taylor has produced a
work of advocacy with a two-fold purpose: to create "an account
of the prostitution of Soviet justice to serve State ends,"' and to
publicize this failure of justice in order to "aid or comfort the
victims of these abuses, and their friends and relatives."' He
achieves the first goal, in large part, by describing his efforts and
those of a number of attorneys and law professors to secure the
release of twenty-three prisoners in the Soviet Union. In so doing,
he describes the unusual procedures and occasionally extraordi-
nary application of criminal provisions under which these prison-
ers were convicted. Whether publication of this work will achieve
his second goal is a subjective judgment, but as he notes in Chap-
ter 10, disclosure may serve to "systematize the spreading of in-
formation about these cases" and continue whatever momentum
has been achieved. 3
Professor Taylor's actual clients were the prisoners' relatives
who had emigrated to Israel.4 Most of the prisoners were Jewish,
and all had sought to emigrate to Israel or to aid Soviet citizens
who wanted to do so. They were charged with and convicted of a
wide variety of crimes ranging in seriousness from attempted
treason to malicious hooliganism.
In an unusual and seemingly naive approach to this type of
problem, Professor Taylor and his associates initially decided to
operate quietly through ordinary Soviet legal procedures, rather
than launch an overtly political and public campaign. The basic
procedure they chose was to attempt to convince the Office of the
Procurator General (Prokuratura) to exercise its power to protest
* Assistant Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; B.A., College of the Holy Cross,
1964; M.I.A., LL.B., Columbia University, 1968.
1. T. TAYLOR, COURTS OF TERROR, at x (1976) [hereinafter cited as CouRTs oF
TERRORI.
2. Id. at xi.
3. Id. at 66.
4. Because of the impossibility of contacting many of the prisoners, the only persons
who had standing and were available to those engaged in the project were relatives who
had so emigrated. Id. at 20.
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the convictions and have the cases reopened.- Ultimately, after
several meetings with Soviet authorities and the submission of
extensive legal and factual materials, their attempt to secure
relief for the prisoners through normal Soviet legal channels
failed.
The text, which describes these efforts, comprises less than
half the volume; the balance consists of five appendices contain-
ing extracts from the legal and factual materials used by Profes-
sor Taylor and his associates. Here, relevant statutes, copies of
petitions to the Soviet Government, legal memoranda, affidavits,
and correspondence generated by the project are 'reproduced.
These appendices provide voluminous documentation of the au-
thor's conclusion that serious injustice was inflicted in these
cases.
Professor Taylor contends that these convictions were part of
a State policy "to discourage Jewish emigration without appear-
ing to prohibit it,"' and he sets forth numerous examples of the
procedures utilized to accomplish that end. He argues that in
some instances charges were fabricated,7 and in others penal stat-
utes were stretched beyond their intended scope to encompass the
acts of certain defendants.8 More fundamentally, he asserts that
all these cases reflect a pervasive pattern of disregard for normal
Soviet procedural safeguards. Finally, he maintains that, in
many cases, unusually harsh sentences were imposed and that
conditions of imprisonment were excessively severe or cruel.
As an advocate, the author generally succeeds in proving his
accusations. His discussion of the procedures followed at trial
shows a number of unusual departures from Soviet legal norms.
These include limitations on the right of cross-examination,9 re-
5. See generally H. BERMAN, JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R. 238-47 (1963); R. DAVID & J.
BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY 163-64 (1968); Boim, Procuracy, 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOVIET LAW 545, 548 (F. Feldbrugge ed. 1973).
6. COURTS OF TERROR, at x.
7. An example is the Pinkhasov case, discussed in id. at 56-58, involving alleged
overcharges for carpentry services.
8. Examples include the widely publicized Leningrad trials where the defendants,
accused of attempting to hijack an airplane, were convicted of violating the treason statute
(Article 64, R.S.F.S.R., Criminal Code), COURTS OF TERROR, 6-10, 35-36, 148-53, and the
Shkolnik case, in which the crime charged was espionage, id. at 12-13, 119-27.
9. The first of the two Leningrad trials involved one such instance. There, when a
State witness appeared about to say something beneficial to the defendants, he was
excused from the stand and no defense questions were allowed. Id. at 24, 99-100, 135.
Another example occurred in the Feldman trial. Id. at 55 n.
1976]
BROOKLYN J. INTL L.
fusals to hear expert witnesses, 0 and limitations on the rights of
defense counsel."
Insofar as the author's assertions about sentences and prison
conditions are concerned, he builds a powerful case. For example,
maximum sentences were frequently imposed for attempts, with-
out distinguishing them from the completed acts." Even more
importantly, Professor Taylor shows that prison conditions were
often highly unusual. Some of the Jewish defendants were con-
fined in camps in which an overwhelming majority of the prison-
ers were persons convicted of collaborating with Nazi forces dur-
ing World War II. Affidavits of former Jewish prisoners in these
camps attest to many instances of victimization by anti-Semitic
fellow prisoners. 3 There were also a number of official attempts
to penalize or discourage religious practices.'4
However, some of Professor Taylor's assertions appear to
have less merit. There is little evidence of refusals by the courts
to hear defense witnesses other than the exclusion of expert testi-
mony and the refusal to allow "anti-Soviet" literature to be read
in open court by the defendants. 5 His arguments relating to the
inadequacy of Soviet defense counsel fail to recognize the tension
inherent in the concept of socialist legality between an attorney's
duty to society and his duty to a client. Soviet law has long
recognized that an attorney plays a dual role in which his duty
10. Professor Taylor states that the conclusions of experts who did not testify were
relied upon by the court in determining that certain literature was anti-Soviet in nature,
without according defendants the opportunity to obtain the opinions of other experts.
More seriously, he asserts that these opinions, contained in the investigative files compiled
on certain defendants, were not made part of the oral proceedings at trial. See generally
id. at 36-38, 137-40, 159, 162.
11. Thus, in the case of Shkolnik, prison authorities apparently prevented a meeting
with counsel. See id. at 38-39, 167-68.
12. In the first Leningrad trial, two of the defendants, convicted of attempted treason
for seeking to steal an airplane in order to escape from the Soviet Union, were originally
sentenced to death. Subsequently, after protests were raised in a number of countries
against the severity of these sentences, the sentences were commuted on appeal to fifteen
years imprisonment. Id. at 8-9. See also id. at 154-55.
13. See id. at 25, 163, 165-66, 169-72, 175.
14. Id. In at least one case, the prison authorities forcibly interfered with and pre.
vented religious observance. Id. at 172.
15. The simple refusal, without more, to utilize expert witnesses does not appear to
be a violation of Soviet legal norms. But see note 10, supra. Ordinarily, the decision as to
whether expert witnesses are necessary rests with the prosecutor. The defendant only has
the right to ask for the opinion of a different expert. This request may be granted or
refused. See Kiralfy, Expert Witnesses, Criminal Procedure, 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SovIET
LAW 263 (F. Feldbrugge ed. 1973); Fincke, Defendant, id. at 212, 213, 215-16. See also
Articles 184, 185, R.S.F.S.R., Code of Criminal Procedure.
[Vol. III:l
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to represent his client is subordinated to his duty to advance the
goals of socialism."6
Finally, while the author establishes that criminal statutes
were construed too broadly in order to reach some of the defen-
dants, a number of his supporting arguments appear to overstate
the case. For example, one of Professor Taylor's major points
arises from the application of the treason statute, Article 64,
R.S.F.S.R. Criminal Code, to the defendants in the Leningrad
trials who had attempted to leave the Soviet Union by hijacking
a small airplane to Sweden. He argues that a major element of
the treason charges, proof of intent, depended upon proof of pos-
session and distribution of anti-Soviet literature. This is a sepa-
rate crime punishable under Article 70, R.S.F.S.R. Criminal
Code, and Professor Taylor contends that intent sufficient to con-
vict under that Article was never proved. He concludes from this
that the conviction under Article 64 was invalid because the req-
uisite intent was never shown. However, Professor Taylor does
not explain why facts insufficient to establish intent under Article
70 might not, nevertheless, be sufficient to establish the intent
required by Article 64, a separate statute.7
16. Barry & Berman, The Soviet Legal Profession, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1968);
Malone, The Soviet Bar, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 258, 278-80 (1961).
17. This contention is raised in Courts of Terror at 35-36 and argued in depth at 135-
41. See also COURTS OF TERROR 148-52. Professor Taylor argues correctly in one of the
group's legal memoranda, id. at 136, that proof of treason under Article 64 requires proof
of intent to harm the Soviet Union in addition to proof of the overt act of attempted flight.
However, the author proceeds to assert that the prosecution relied heavily on "the hostility
to the Soviet Union that supposedly was implicit in distributing literature in violation of
§70" to establish this intent. Id. He then concludes that, since guilt was not properly
established under Article 70, the requisite intent under that article was not established
and could not have been utilized to establish intent under Article 64.
This conclusion does not necessarily follow. First, it is clear that the language of the
two statutes differs significantly in defining requisite intent. Article 64 requires the act to
be "to the detriment of the state independence, the territorial inviolability, or the military
might of the U.S.S.R." Id. at 72. For Article 70, the act must be "for the purpose of
subverting or weakening the Soviet regime or of committing particular, especially danger-
ous crimes against the state." Id. Second, as a subsequent memorandum points out,
"[sleveral Soviet legal writings have argued that anti-Soviet motives convert an illegal
exit into treason under 64(a)." Id. at 150. It may well be that the anti-Soviet motives
required by Article 64 differ from the intent required under Article 70. Thus while "host il-
ity to the Soviet Union supposedly implicit in distributing literature" may not necessarily
establish the requisite intent under Article 70, it may be a sufficient basis for a finding of
intent under Article 64. While Professor Taylor quite properly raised the question of intent
in his submissions to the Prokuratura, the legal materials supporting this legal contention
do not support the broad factual assertion in the text that "[ilt seems clear, accordingly,
that Articles 64 [and another statute] were invoked by the Soviet authorities, despite
their manifest inapplicability, in order to subject the defendants to the jeopardy of capital
sentences." Id. at 36 (emphasis added).
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Though Courts of Terror generally succeeds in exposing the
injustices perpetrated.in these cases and in illustrating the effect
of political considerations on the administration of Soviet crimi-
nal law, the book suffers from a major and irremediable flaw that
is a necessary result of the method chosen by Professor Taylor and
his associates to obtain the release of these prisoners. The book
is a description of a project which, from the beginning, had few
prospects for success, and which actually appears to have been
counterproductive. The attempt to influence the Prokuratura
caused a delay of about two years in publicizing the plight of
these prisoners, who are only now receiving the notice they would
have obtained had the author publicized their plight immedi-
ately. While the dedication of Professor Taylor and his project
members is admirable, this account of their activities leaves only
a strong and dissatisfying sense of frustration.
In a broader context, Courts of Terror provides valuable in-
sight into a more general phenomenon of interest to students of
international affairs. This is the increasing frequency of bilateral
dealings between private persons and foreign sovereigns in politi-
cal and social matters, a type of interaction that is "quasi-public"
in nature. The book is unusual in that it is both product and
process, a description of an unsuccessful effort in this area as well
as an illustration of still another form of quasi-public interaction.
First, Professor Taylor's project was an effort to influence the
governmental decisions of a foreign nation by working within that
nation's political system. The activities described bear a striking
resemblance to efforts at international lobbying ordinarily asso-
ciated with multinational corporations. In effect, Professor Tay-
lor and his associates, citizens of the United States, represented
clients, citizens of Israel, before an agency of the Soviet Govern-
ment in an effort to change what the author maintains was a
political decision. Except for the specific goals involved, it is
difficult to distinguish these actions from those of representatives
of a corporation seeking to change a foreign State's import or tax
policies."8
Second, Courts of Terror is an illustration of another form of
public-private interaction in international affairs in that it is it-
self an appeal to world opinion. Again, the goal is alteration of a
18. See generally R. BARNET & R. MOLLER, GLOBAL REACH (1974); Note, Multinational
"Payoffs" Abroad: International Repercussions and Domestic Liabilities, 2 BROOKLYN J.
INT'L L. 108 (1975).
[Vol. IIIJl
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foreign country's political decision by private parties. Here, how-
ever, the approach is indirect and more closely resembles the
activities of organizations such as the International Chamber of
Commerce or Amnesty International.'"
While the efforts described in Courts of Terror are examples
of relatively innocuous forms of quasi-public international inter-
action, such conduct is not the only means by which private
parties may try to influence State policy. The means available are
manifold and their legality runs the gamut from the forbidden to
the encouraged under municipal law.
Most nations would concede some degree of legality to the
conduct of Professor Taylor and his associates. However, some
types of quasi-public activity fall within a gray area of legality:
bribery may be a common practice in some states, condoned ei-
ther tacitly or expressly; 0 personal pressures or private special
relationships may be utilized;2' private boycotts, such as those
against South African businesses, may be organized;22 and politi-
cal contributions designed to influence public policy may be more
important than previously thought.23 Finally, still other forms of
conduct, such as hijacking or political violence, are clearly illegal
under the municipal law of most nations.24 Yet, all these
means-whether legal, illegal or doubtful under municipal
law-have been used by private parties and sometimes ap-
plauded by nations whose political goals coincide with those of
the private actors. 25
19. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, ANNUAL REPORT 1974/75 (1975); AMNESTY INTERNA-
TIONAL, REPORT ON TORTURE (1973). See also N.Y. Times, May 29, 1973, at 52, col. 4.
20. See Note, Multinational "Payoffs" Abroad: International Repercussions and
Domestic Liabilities, supra note 18, at 111-13.
21. Indeed, Professor Taylor notes that his personal acquaintance with the Soviet
Procurator General, Roman Rudenko, assisted him in his attempt to gain direct access to
that official and thus request permission to submit the materials prepared by him and
his associates to the Prokuratura. COURTS OF TERROR 18. See also id. at 28.
22. An analogous effort can be perceived in attempts by certain stockholders of Gen-
eral Motors Corporation to terminate that company's economic involvement in South
Africa. N.Y. Times, May 22, 1971, at 39, col. 1.
23. N.Y. Times, May 16, 1975, at 47, col. 2.
24. As Professor Taylor notes, the Soviet Union promulgated an anti-hijacking stat-
ute in January 1973. COURTS OF TERROR 45 n. See also 49 U.S.C. § 1472 (Supp. V, 1975).
25. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, May 6, 1970, at 18, col. 4 (Molotov cocktails and rocks
thrown at United States cultural center in West Berlin protesting United States interven-
tion in Cambodia); N.Y. Times, Apr. 16, 1970, at 1, col. 7 (violent protests directed against
United States property in Jordan).
Hijacking of airplanes by terrorist groups may be a somewhat special type of quasi-
public international activity. To some extent, actions by persons contesting governmental
sovereignty have been the subject of marginal regulation by international law. See, e.g.,
19761
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Despite the varying forms and degrees of legality of these
courses of conduct, the types of participants remain constant. In
all cases, the initiating party is private and the party sought to
be affected is governmental. Such an interrelationship may not
be unusual in domestic politics, or in commercial intercourse
where the activities of nations are not governmental in a tradi-
tional sense. However, international transactions attempting to
influence traditional governmental policies of foreign nations
have little in the way of historic precedent. Consequently, there
is no developed body of law governing these political contacts. "
Despite some recent ad hoc attempts to control certain forms
of quasi-public international activity, there has been no coherent
effort at a unified approach to its regulation. Indeed, even limited
attempts at control have met with little success.2" These results,
in large part, are due to a failure of States to perceive the long-
term necessity for neutral regulation without regard to specific
goals or motives of the private parties. Instead, short-term politi-
cal considerations have prevented the development of any law
governing these relationships.
Obviously, policy considerations will always influence the
activities of independent nations to a substantial degree in ap-
proaching any form of international regulation. This is true of
both the decision to create such regulations and the decision to
submit to them. In this area of public-private interaction, such
policy questions are readily apparent. For example, Professor
Taylor's activities were undertaken for reasons that most in the
2 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 298 (8th ed. H. Lauterpacht 1955). Thus, insofar
as hijackings or other forms of violence are committed against a Sovereign by those private
persons who contest its exercise of sovereignty, such actions are not a major departure in
quality from similar actions in the past. However, insofar as these activities are attempts
to influence nations other than the one whose sovereignty is challenged, the relationship
to the newer form of quasi-public activity is clearer. Compare N.Y. Times, July 4, 1976,
at 1, col. 7 (hijacking of airplane by terrorists to force Israel to release pro-Palestinian
prisoners) with N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1972, at 1, col. 1 (hijacking of airplane to force
Federal Republic of Germany to release Arab commandos held for slaying of Israeli ath-
letes at 1972 Munich Olympics).
26. Classically, international law has been regarded as governing only relations
among nations or international organizations. Advisory Opinion on Reparation for Injuries
Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, [1949] I.C.J. 174; L. SOHN & T. BUEROEN-
THAI., INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 108 (1973).
27. E.g., Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, done Dec.
16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192, has not been ratified by a number of States.
Of those nations which have ratified it, a large number have done so with reservations.
For the response of the United States to this lack of success, see 49 U.S.C. § 1514 (Supp.
IV, 1974), authorizing the President to suspend air service to States acting in a manner
inconsistent with the Convention.
[Vol. III:l
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West would consider beneficent. However, it is unlikely that the
Soviet Union would so characterize them. Similarly, the reaction
of United States officials to foreign private attempts to conduct
''war crimes trials" during the conflict in Vietnam illustrates that
any characterization of even this type of quasi-public interna-
tional activity may be largely a political matter of "whose ox is
gored."2 8
Quasi-public international activity has been dealt with on a
case-by-case basis by States. As a result of this piecemeal ap-
proach, nations have given insufficient consideration to two
major reasons underlying the adoption and enforcement of all
rules of law in international relations. These are, first, the strong
political interest of each nation in conducting its internal or dip-
lomatic affairs without outside interference and, second, the need
for some standard against which the propriety of such outside
conduct may be measured.
The conduct of private individuals and corporations or asso-
ciations can intimately affect the economic, social or political
interests of all States. Therefore, the absence of law in this area
poses gFeat problems to all nations. This growing field of human
activity, the future limits of which seem boundless, currently
lacks any conceptual underpinnings or a clear definition of rights
and duties.
When this lack of a conceptual framework and its possible
impact upon nations is recognized, the need for some unified and
neutral approach toward these activities becomes apparent.
Without such an approach, it is unlikely that any meaningful
regulation acceptable to all nations can be achieved since transi-
tory political interests will continue to obscure the broader and
deeper problem that extends to the heart of the concept of na-
tional sovereignty.
Of course, immediate policy considerations will continue to
influence the activities of independent nations regardless of the
development of rules of law in the quasi-public area. Neverthe-
less, while laws may be broken, particularly in the international
field, political considerations often lead to the observance of de-
fined legal norms. This is so because, as a matter of policy, the
benefits perceived as flowing from generalized observance of these
norms will ordinarily outweigh the transitory political benefits
that may accrue from a breach."
28. See generally N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1967, § 6 (Magazine), at 24.
29. L. HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE 31-44 (1968).
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It is the combination of the potential impact of quasi-public
international activities and the value of a set of consistent unified
rules that makes obvious the need for international regulation in
this area. Courts of Terror illustrates the growth of this area of
activity and raises questions about the types of regulation that
may be necessary. As an attempt to vindicate human rights, it
underlines the difficulties inherent in any attempt to subject
quasi-public international contacts to rules of law. As such, it also
provides a valuable counterpoint to the publicity accorded to
other less desirable forms of this activity in recent years. Perhaps
this and other studies in the field will prompt a wider recognition
of the need for legal regulation in this area, as well as an examina-
tion of the means by which such a rule of law might be developed
and implemented. While Courts of Terror raises these and other
questions, it provides no answers. One can only hope that some
may be forthcoming in the future.
